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Democracy implies, if nothing else, citizen participation in crafting the political institutions 
those same citizens inhabit, even if the actual contours of such participation have been widely 
contested. Majoritarian voting procedures and public deliberation are the two most popular 
implementations of the ideals of democratic rule, but they do not exhaust the entire field of 
possibilities. Zhang Shizhao章士釗 (1885-1973), an early twentieth century Chinese political 
thinker, uses the participatory promise of democracy to challenge China’s traditional elitism and 
bureaucracy, but he privileges “self-awareness” (自覺) rather than a form of collective action as 
foundational to this democratic practice.  Although Zhang wrote shortly after the establishment of 
republican government in China, and during a time of unprecedented Western influence, his “self-
aware” individual bears a more than superficial resemblance to the literati-bureaucrats who were the 
primary political actors under the Chinese dynastic empire. However, while contemporaries invoked 
the literatus ideal to claim a right to educate and manipulate the masses, Zhang recasts the literatus 
posture to formulate a new form of political action: one that disaggregates the “group” (群) concept 
central to contemporary elite political thinking, and in turn opens greater spaces for political 
participation.  In the process of elaborating the requirements of self-awareness, and demonstrating 
its efficacy in building a regime of self-rule where none existed before, Zhang shows how thinking 
about political action in an individualized rather than collective way can leverage resources for 
changing shared human environments that would otherwise be overlooked.   
I evaluate Zhang’s model through an extended engagement with the work of Hanna Pitkin, 
who throughout her career has specifically addressed—as a problem for and of democratic 
politics—the kind of individualized action that Zhang advocates.  By self-awareness, Zhang means 
the ability of individuals to see their political and social selves critically and imaginatively, in the 
context of China’s immanent post-revolutionary political demise. He triangulates from these 
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particular vantage points a new republican regime, built on the incremental changes that accumulate 
as individuals shed their roles as imperial subjects and envision themselves as citizens of a republic.  
Although Pitkin shares with Zhang his sympathies for individually differentiated action in the 
process of founding polities, she would argue that his model threatens to individually impose, rather 
than collectively craft, the conditions and goals of political life. Self-awareness implies a tyrannical 
process of manipulation, because the self-aware individual in effect assumes the role of an “epic” 
political theorist (to borrow Sheldon Wolin’s term)1  in which he sees other people as objects and 
himself as the only relevant decision-maker.2  Pitkin emphasizes the need for the theorist to 
overcome such tyranny by dissolving the “I that theorizes” into a participatory “we that acts.”  Her 
argument reflects a widespread democratic impulse to resist any orders – even abstract ones – that 
are not truly the product of all who are affected by them.3  Her work offers a particularly bold 
counterpoint to Zhang’s insistence that only the awareness of and by individuals can constitute a 
foundation for political action that neither imposes nor invites tyranny.   
My argument below does not attempt to defend the entirety of Zhang’s vision of “self-
awareness” as much as use Pitkin’s arguments to sketch its limits and possibilities, especially with 
respect to the relationship between political action and political theory in a context of irreducible 
plurality and political breakdown.  Zhang’s exhortations to “self-awareness” may not provide an 
exhaustive account of political action under mature regimes, but it does draw attention to the 
difficulties of concerted action when taking steps radical enough to stop the inertia both Pitkin and 
Zhang find so inimical to self-rule.  This is particularly so in situations where a community’s 
members have not yet built democratic relationships among each other, or cultivated particular 
shared commitments, to make coordinated action in concert possible. In these kinds of situations, 
the unilaterally initiated, individual awareness that Zhang encourages seems both necessary and 
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effective, even as it courts a dangerously atomized political self.  Recognizing this danger, we can 
exploit its critical edge: self-awareness ultimately interrogates the identity of political action with 
collective action, even as it provides a conceptual framework to think about how disparate 
individuals qua individuals can gain traction on shared problems before collective action is possible.   
 
The Problem of Theory 
Zhang wrote and thought in an environment marked by unprecedented intellectual and 
political upheaval in China.  For most of his influential, early career, Zhang argued for a 
constitutionally limited parliamentary cabinet system modeled after that of Great Britain.4  His 
support of constitutionalism in an era of revolution embraced rule of law over the radical politics of 
Sun Yatsen and his revolutionary factions, leading many modern-day commentators on Zhang’s 
work to focus exclusively on his contributions to institutional design and political reform.5 Zhang’s 
arguments for constitutionalism did help to elaborate an institutional framework during the 
republican era, but I focus in this essay on Zhang’s often overlooked theoretical reflections on the 
establishment of republican rule in China. For Zhang, theoretical explanations grew more central to 
his defense of constitutional democracy in the years following 1911, after the elected President 
Yuan Shikai dissolved the national assembly and began centralizing his control over the fledgling 
republic.6  Many contemporary thinkers blamed not institutional design but China’s low level of 
political education for this turn of events, and endorsed as an antidote elite-led, top-down 
transformations of Chinese social and political practices.7  Zhang countered these suggestions 
primarily on a theoretical level, understanding the issue in terms of how the founding of a new 
tradition of constitutional democracy could abide by the principles of self-rule it hoped to secure. 
His establishment in 1914 of The Tiger, an influential journal of political opinion,8 gave Zhang the 
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space and authority to parse out the steps toward self-rule that theoretically precede institutional 
effectiveness.   
Unwilling to concede to elites the sole power to manipulate and control the masses, yet 
faced with the reality of political collapse, Zhang locates the constitutive elements of republican 
regime consolidation in the personal orientations of individual citizens, rather than their leaders.  In 
two essays that appeared in the first volume of The Tiger— “The State and the Self” (國家與我) 
and “Self-awareness” (自覺)—Zhang identifies self-awareness as what links personal orientations 
to the possibilities of self-rule.  He alludes to a story from the Mencius, a seminal text of the 
Confucian tradition that Zhang’s audience had most likely memorized in early childhood, to locate 
the spirit of self-awareness in a personal reaction to political power.  
 
“Mencius has said [to King Hui of Liang]: “Now, [suppose] your Majesty is having 
music here. The people hear the noise of your bells and drums, and the notes of your 
fifes and pipes, and they all, with aching heads, knit their brows, and say, ‘Our king 
so enjoys his music, but why does he reduce us to such an extreme state [of distress]? 
Fathers and sons cannot see one another. Elder brothers and younger brothers, wives 
and children, are separated and scattered abroad.’” [Mencius 1.2.2] …Getting a 
headache [from this situation] is a reaction you can’t say is not a source for self-
awareness, but it doesn’t go a step further and say, ‘Now that I am in such an 
extreme state, how can I act as a king (王為)?’ Because our state lacked this kind of 
true self-awareness, for millennia we have only had a history of rulers (君), and not a 
history of the people (民).9 
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In this description of “self-awareness,” Zhang portrays the disjuncture between some ideal 
state of affairs and a gravely troubled political reality as an actual physical pain, and therefore most 
acutely felt on the individual register.10  It is this individual pain that prompts reflection on “how I 
can act as a king,” in the process transforming the individual from an imperial subject to one who 
participates in ruling.  As Zhang portrays it here, self-awareness is a process of interrogating who 
the rulers are supposed to be, and how those who do rule undertake effective action in the world.  
Although an implicit part of rule by “the people,” because it in some way constitutes the agency of 
the people’s history, the headache that facilitates self-awareness nevertheless does not entail 
questions about membership and exclusion, as much as a cultivation of a particular, internal self-
orientation.  With the turn to individualized feeling, Zhang reduces government by the people (民) 
to an awareness of and by the self (here articulated as the “I,” 我).  Zhang insists that the very 
process of an individual coming to a realization and making a decision is precisely what constitutes 
the state; indeed, once this realization is made, “the work of creating a state is already half-done.”11   
Acquiring self-awareness to Zhang is thus a process that fosters democratic practices and 
subjectivities spontaneously, without recourse to the top-down control Yuan Shikai and foreign 
advisors like Frank Goodnow were advocating.  Its goal is to motivate the differentiated 
comprehension by China’s citizens that the “loss of the state” (亡國) is a direct result of their 
personal disengagement from both social and political life.12  The “loss of the state” is a term 
traditionally identified with the fall of a dynasty, but Zhang reinterprets it to mean the loss of the 
republican polity to authoritarian rule—a loss caused not by deliberate political manipulation, but 
by an unconscious perception that the immanent collapse of the republic is a matter of fate rather 
than a matter for (individual) human intervention.13  Such desperation drove many of Zhang’s 
compatriots to flee abroad, smoke opium, or give up on the constructive everyday activities that 
6 
 
kept Chinese society functioning.14  Zhang believes self-awareness will rescue his contemporaries 
from fatalism, by motivating them to re-think how their individual choices and lifestyles are 
constitutive of republican polity-building. He urges his audience to become entrepreneurial about 
finding ways to “use their talents” in a hostile world, whether that be writing political opinion 
pieces, caring for one’s family and friends, or simply remaining aloof from corruption.  He insists 
that even those “who have no natural talent, but have the courage to go forward, perhaps by being 
involved in a vocation or in running a business,” are essential contributions to the polity-building 
process.15  To Zhang, personal behavior, whether good or bad, “does not transcend the scope of 
politics.”16 
By encouraging citizens to rethink how their personal lives affect political outcomes and 
vice-versa, Zhang hopes self-awareness will consolidate republican practices in a deeper way than 
elite-led transformations could make possible.   Self-awareness effects this transformation by 
presuming a link between theory-building capacity and the efficacious actions that build and sustain 
regimes of self-rule. The act of re-seeing one’s self, everyday activities, and environment in a 
different light, Zhang seems to think, both motivates and constitutes social and political 
transformation: people change their political worlds by changing themselves.  Zhang even goes so 
far as to claim that “although the state may be taken over by those in power, the power to establish 
the state still lies within the self.  If I want the state to be square, it will be square; if I want it to be 
round, it will be round.”17    
Yet, as Hanna Pitkin has pointed out, the integration of political action with theory poses a 
set of unique tensions when it is acknowledged that others possess equal capacity for political 
participation.  According to Pitkin, for the theorist to perform his unique task efficaciously, he must 
be separate from others in a way that renders him capable of transcending any one particular 
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viewpoint: the very purpose of theory is a critical reconceptualization of political life so as to 
discern what is necessary from what can and should be done.18  This is precisely Zhang’s point in 
promoting self-awareness, but Pitkin worries that the generic rules such abstraction demands will 
reflect more of the theorist’s own agenda than the reality of the free subjects that he presumes create 
political order. “The theorist stands outside the political system about which he speculates and 
writes; of necessity he deploys and manipulates its citizens without consulting their wishes or 
opinions.”19  
For these reasons, Pitkin argues that the integration of theorizing with political action can 
never be the solitary activity that Zhang expects; rather, it is made possible only by bridging the gap 
between the theorist and his or her “subjects” by way of public action. To Pitkin, political action 
and political beginnings ultimately must focus on the collaborative efforts of the entire community 
rather than on the actions and demands of one person acting alone.  Just as individuals cannot create 
their own personal languages, neither can they initiate unilateral political change without taking into 
account the existing “grammar” of the community that gives meaning to their actions and words,20 
and that is alone capable of executing the entirety of a theoretical vision.  The very plurality of the 
public realm inveighs against seeing the initiation of action in mechanistic or biological terms, 
where individual beginnings might be meaningful. Biological beginnings presume a relationship of 
direct causality between act and response, but political beginnings insert themselves into a 
community of individuals whose responses are open-ended and unpredictable.21  
These characteristics of action in a community of self-rule suggest that Zhang’s attempt to 
found a republican polity should turn away from individual theorizing, and build instead on the 
insight that founding new political regimes is ultimately a “co-founding”—a process of mutual 
recognition by citizens of their shared tasks, hopes, and responsibilities.22  According to Pitkin, the 
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ideal of a lone founder, “an auctor who initiates and induces the free actions of others, so that his 
project becomes what they willingly carry out,” is a “fantasy solution” to the problem of making 
citizens.23 If theoretical exercises like self-awareness are to be effective and meaningful politically, 
they must be political interventions—that is, linked to the “concerted action” that for Pitkin defines 
politics.24 This means relating “I” to “we,” promoting decisions for effective intervention made in 
the name of and by the community collectively.25   
 Pitkin’s account is valuable because it links republican commitments to equal participation 
with their concrete, real-world efficacy, teasing out the implications of the fact that the world can 
never be the creation of any one individual even when he acts with absolute political authority. At 
the same time, however, she leaves underspecified the precise steps by which individual theorizing 
relates to collective self-rule, and this oversight has important consequences for how future changes 
in an existing political system can take place.  On the one hand, Pitkin does place the agent at the 
center of any strategy to change those conditions of inertia and self-indulgence that in early work 
she calls “drift.” In Blob, Pitkin associates these conditions with “the social”: a situation “in which a 
collectivity of people—for whatever reason—cannot (or at any rate do not) effectively take charge 
of the overall resultants of what they are severally doing.”26  Yet on the other, her solution is 
ultimately the establishment of politics “where politics could and should be,” the spontaneous 
engagement by a community of “shared self-government, public freedom.”27  She revises an earlier 
fear about the unique potency of the lone theorist to affirm that such capacity for theory and for 
action is really more diffuse than she had originally portrayed it,28 but continues to characterizes the 
“isolated deviant individual” who works to change political institutions as “utterly helpless”: for 
Pitkin, action “must take the form of concerted action if it is to help us.”29  In fact, individual 
actions cannot be “political” until they are read in terms of the coordinated, collective efforts to 
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which they contribute.30  This interpretation of “political” action does not deny the importance of 
individual capacity, but it does insist that we must act with others before we can become effective at 
changing reality, or before our unilateral interventions into a wider community can be authorized.  
Yet the problem with conditions of “drift” or “the social” is precisely that collaborative 
efforts of “co-founding” and concerted action are not forthcoming, and therefore cannot be relied 
upon as vehicles for change, or for the “rejoining of the concrete and general, local and large-scale” 
that both she and Zhang seem to be pursuing.31   Pitkin claims at one point that the community is 
“always already free to become free,” meaning that the spontaneous coalescence of individuals in 
public action only awaits a revival.32  But even this possibility assumes a context of political 
experience that can be remembered or made accessible by reference to existing concepts and 
practices—a difficult task even for the “thoughtless,” but much more so for those living in 
communities that have not “forgotten” this “lost treasure” of public freedom, but have never in their 
history experienced it.33   She tells individuals to “just do it!”, all the while characterizing their 
solitary actions as nonpolitical and ineffective. Zhang’s turn to “self-awareness,” after years of 
advocating distinctly institutional measures for political betterment, wrestles with these very 
difficulties of presuming public, concerted action as the primary antidote to social inertia and 
political collapse.  By formulating a different relationship between theory and political action, 
Zhang explores alternatives to collective action as a device of social and political change.   
Beginning from before 1913, when the so-called “second revolution” to oust the 
increasingly predatory Yuan Shikai from power ended in failure, Chinese intellectuals were faced 
with the apparent collapse not only of the republican regime, but of politics more generally.  The 
twin realms of “society” (社會) and “culture” (文化) became new sites of elite manipulation and 
reform as polity-building receded in the face of its apparent uselessness.34  Zhang and his colleagues 
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at The Tiger gained fame during this debate for defending the need to “talk about politics” (論政) 
and to attend to politically-centered measures of social betterment, including reform of the 
provisional constitution.35  Institutionally, Zhang advocated a system of provincial self-rule to help 
local communities secure their political autonomy against top-down control from an increasingly 
authoritarian center.36  Yet in light of repeated failures to consolidate the republic and to achieve 
consensus even on fundamental matters of institutional design, Zhang’s defense of the meaning and 
efficacy of political action eventually needed to address the political in a way that did not turn on 
concerted action or existing institutions—at that time, the possibility of acting together with others 
was precisely what a model of political action needed to explain. Unlike Pitkin’s co-founding 
citizens, whose mutual recognition emerges from a spontaneous, “renovating return to 
beginnings,”37  Zhang and his contemporary Chinese have nothing to return to, except an imperial 
past they have already forsaken. Their ideal republic lies only in the future and in their (disparate) 
imaginations. 
In this context, Zhang formulates a relationship between the individual theorist and the 
wider community that focuses on the capacity of lone individuals to act, but that does not abandon a 
republican characterization of political authority as diffuse and ground-up. Although in many ways 
complementary to Pitkin’s account, Zhang nevertheless suggests that thinking about an individual’s 
political action as necessarily oriented toward coordinated action with others can sometimes 
obstruct rather than inspire those personal transformations that both he and Pitkin believe shape 
shared political environments. The exercises in self-reflection and imaginative visualization that 
constitute self-awareness disaggregate larger political transformations into personal commitments, 
prompting individuals to act precisely when and because others are not acting.  
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Individualism 
During the crisis in political faith that followed the failure of the “second revolution” and 
Yuan’s subsequent consolidation of executive power, Zhang’s defenses of the self and its relevance 
to political outcomes grew more elaborate.38   These defenses are most explicit in a pair of essays 
Zhang published in 1916 and 1917. One, titled “Beginnings” (發端), inaugurated the new daily 
edition of his journal The Tiger. The other, titled simply “Self” (我), appeared in the Eastern 
Miscellany, one of the longest-running and influential Republican-era journals, known for its focus 
on issues of self and psychology and their relationship to politics.39  In these essays, Zhang specifies 
the dangers of “forgetting the self” (忘我) and the urgent need for “searching for the self” (求我) by 
explaining the relationship between the self and the external world.  
 
The self is not something one person gets and then keeps to himself…What 
individuals are engaged in doing has its own logical space. This is called “the self”. 
What is called “exerting all one’s effort” (盡其在我) is to act within this space with 
integrity and persistence. What is called “searching for the self” is to search within 
this space rather than fleeing from it. When what I can do, is clearly coordinated with 
this space, this can truly be called “achieving the self.” It is like a light in a room: if I 
use a candle to take a portion of this light, the light is divided but the light in the 
room remains just as it was before. The strength of the light does not increase or 
decrease based on the number of people who have divided it up. Thus, if what is 
called “self” just stops at the “inhibited self,” then you will be able to feed, clothe, 
and shelter oneself and perhaps one’s friends and associates. But ultimately the 
affairs of heaven and earth will not matter at all [to you].  However, if what you 
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achieve is the “unbounded self,” this is the logical [space for the] self, the self that 
has not expended its light. Thus what is achieved will not be [limited to] something 
just one individual happens to acquire by chance, but will be something that becomes 
linked to social mores and the minds of others.40 
 
This passage suggests the mechanism by which Zhang expects his self-aware individuals to make 
an impact. The “self” becomes “unbounded” – that is, effective – not by communicating directly 
and purposefully with others, or by engaging in the kinds of political behavior that typically mark 
democratic regimes, such as voting, mass action, or holding political office. Rather, by attending to 
his own talents, integrity and courage, the self-aware individual becomes “linked to the social mores 
and minds of others” via the ambient changes his actions have in the world that go on to inspire 
responses. Zhang describes these efforts as “a light in a room”: their divisibility or diffusion does 
not negatively affect their potency, and may even increase it as others see the light and bring 
themselves in line with the exemplary moral behavior these efforts strive toward.    
That means to have effect on others, one does not act in concert with them, deliberate with 
them, or even negotiate with them. Instead, self-awareness prompts one to re-fashion the external 
environment in a manner that allows one to “exercise one’s due portion” by “using one’s talents” 
without denying to others the chance to do the same.41  This is a politics of exemplariness and local 
action, in which one’s self-awareness as a republican citizen will inspire others to act by example to 
do as you do.42  Engaging the wider world both changes oneself, and one’s own incremental self-
awareness constitutes small changes in the wider world that others may then engage. Although the 
external environment influences individual feelings, tendencies and actions, it is equally true that 
individuals are the primary shapers of this environment. “External things (物) and the self (我) are 
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mutually corresponding相對, such that it would be totally ridiculous to speak only of things and not 
the self, to speak only of the self and not of things. Therefore, if there are no ‘selves,’ there can be 
no country; how can we conduct national affairs without ‘selves’?”43   
Placing the individual at the center of political action by activating his capacity for 
theorizing has definite resonances with certain trends in late imperial Chinese thought, a point I 
return to below. Such individualism does, however, sharply distinguish Zhang’s account from most 
other contemporary Chinese treatments of “self-awareness,” which tracked an obsession with 
collective awakening, modernization, and national identity in the face of foreign incursion.44 To 
Zhang’s contemporaries, such as the republican thinker Liang Qichao and the revolutionary activist 
Sun Yatsen, the best hope for Chinese survival lie in grouping together as a nation by recognizing a 
shared ethnic heritage.  The focus on mass action that came to characterize nationalist and, later, 
Communist radicalism in China was built primarily on the insight that such grouping was more 
effective than individual attempts to reshape China’s future. Zhang’s emphasis on individual 
consciousness harkens back to the isolation and impotence of traditional Chinese political 
organization, which in Sun’s view rendered the people like “a heap of loose sand,” unable to 
transcend their parochial commitments in the name of national and social progress.45  
Pitkin’s thoughts on “theory” can rescue Zhang on this point, by explaining how individual 
particularity can strengthen rather than fragment a regime of self-rule. Like other republican 
thinkers, including Arendt, Pitkin recognizes the individual “both as the source of initiative and as 
the locus of moral value and dignity.”46  Similarly, when Zhang attributes to self-awareness the 
exclusive power to “dissolve the nation and rebuild the nation,” and “effect the regeneration of dead 
tissue” that is the state, in part he means to underscore the capacity of individuals to resist the “false 
nationalism” that denies the constitutive role of individual particularity in defining the public 
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good.47  Zhang’s work on individualism, in fact, influenced contemporary Chinese intellectual 
trends such as the student-led May Fourth movement, which saw in the affirmation of individual 
worth an important remedy for the traditional hierarchical ethics of imperial Confucianism.48   
Yet part of the reason Pitkin’s defense of the individual makes sense is because such action, 
as both she and Arendt read it, “is always interaction,” linked to others equally involved in the 
common enterprise of politics.49  May Fourth activists, including Hu Shi, also were careful to 
situate individualism, the “small self,” within the “great self” of society and its demands.  Read in 
these terms, Zhang’s concept of “self-awareness” develops a much-needed account of the personal 
shifts in orientations as individuals transform themselves from imperial subjects to republican 
citizens, but he does not offer an immediate response to either his contemporary critics or to the 
basic principles of modern, self-ruling communities. By leveraging individual sensations and 
orientations, Zhang seems to be heightening rather than resolving the tensions between individual 
efforts to change reality, on the one hand, and the recognition that, in Hannah Arendt’s words, “men, 
not man, live on earth and inhabit the world,” on the other.50  Rather than bridging that gap between 
self and community, self-awareness seems to further widen it.  
Read in terms of contemporary Chinese intellectual dilemmas, however, another paradigm 
for individual action emerges that possibly links individuals to their wider community in a way that 
neither turns on, nor disavows, concerted action. The tension-ridden position of Zhang’s self-aware 
individual can be read as one response to the contradictions of literati action in the face of 
democracy, a dilemma linked closely to the new forms of political action made available by 
European and American democratic theory. The civil exam system that in imperial China funneled 
intellectuals from any social class into government service was abolished in 1905, forcing China’s 
educated elites to reconsider both their relationship to wider Chinese society and their role in 
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political reform.  Fundamental questions about the sources of change in society could no longer be 
deferred to the traditional bureaucratic mechanism or the literati who staffed it, even as intellectuals 
began to question their own central roles in what was now believed to be a profoundly 
malfunctioning political system.  Intellectuals continued to be influenced by the traditional 
obligations of the well-educated classes—who saw themselves as charged with the responsibility to 
care for “all under Heaven”51—even as republican rule necessarily changed the way in which these 
intellectuals identified the proper “subjects” and “objects” of political life.52   
These conceptual puzzles about the status of intellectuals remained an important part of the 
unexamined assumptions of Chinese political theorizing well past the 1911 revolution.53   Zhang, I 
argue, responds to these puzzles by revising the literatus ideal in light of what he identifies as a 
diffuse capacity for self-awareness.  Invoking the literatus as a model not of elite leadership, but of 
the union of political efficacy and theoretical reflection, Zhang believes self-aware individuals can 
perform a similar synthesis of acting and theory that enacts political authority in the process of 
interpreting it.   
 
Literati Action 
Influenced by neo-Confucian cosmology, in which self-reflection could both reveal and 
correct the larger patterns in the external world, the imperial Chinese literatus stood at the center of 
political action under late dynastic rule. As everyday executive of the law, upholder of the 
community’s moral character, and interpreter of the morally and politically authoritative canon of 
Classics, it was the literatus, not the ruler, who perceived himself as primarily responsible for 
effecting the “moral juncture” between normative and actual authority.54  According to the historian 
Thomas Metzger, as a matter of both institutional and conventional practice the cultivated literatus 
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alone had the capacity for political admonishment, constituting in his person the “ultimate vehicle 
of moral insight” into a world that saw authority as ultimately lodged not in one’s social superiors, 
but “in the structure of the cosmos itself as something accessible without mediation to each 
individual will.”55  The literatus’ insight was buttressed by the executive power derived from his 
position within the Chinese imperial bureaucracy, but also by the belief that “while the external 
cosmos was seen as tending organically to unite ultimate being and experienced events, the mind 
had a diffuse, transnatural power to bring this tendency to full realization. That is, the ethical 
activity of the individual could cause vast changes in the social and metaphysical world.”56    
In the manner of imperial literati, Zhang assumes that individual acts of being aware are 
both necessary and sufficient for uniting the normative and empirical authority that constitute 
democratic sovereignty.  Although not usually associated with the self-cultivation theorists who 
drew explicitly from these neo-Confucian traditions in the early republican era, Zhang nevertheless 
banks here on their metaphysical assumptions.57  The “inner” moral struggles of his self-aware 
individuals are meant to mediate, however imperfectly, the “external” reality of the institutions 
those individuals both create yet remain aloof from.  No longer interpreting the Classics, individuals 
nevertheless remain loci for interpretive insight into what it means to be a democratic citizen.    
Yet the political promise of self-rule, the basis of both the 1911 revolution and the republic 
it established, presents two further questions for this model:  how “the people” could become 
effective political actors; and how the erstwhile literati-turned-intellectuals could perform 
effectively within this new structure of authority. As both ruler and ruled, the “people” as an entity 
simultaneously act and are acted upon; in other words, their action is supposed to be both 
normatively authorized and materially effective. The position of the literatus in this triangular 
relationship therefore becomes compromised: no space is left for his decisive action or political 
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insight, for the very reason that he affirms the capacity of everyone else, not only himself, to rule. 
Confronting this new division between the sources of authority, the sources of insight into that 
authority, and the sources of action, intellectuals in republican China confronted the same tensions 
between individual theorist and wider community that Pitkin argues only “public freedom” can 
solve.   
One of the most influential interpretations of this new, dual position of “the people,” and 
their relationship to intellectual elite rule, was elaborated by Zhang’s frequent interlocutor Liang 
Qichao.  Liang’s early essay “On Self-Rule” (論自治), a component of his magisterial and 
influential compendium On Renewing the People, explains that “self-rule” will rescue the Chinese 
people from the mindset that accepts rule by either literati bureaucrats or “hegemons” (authoritarian 
rulers). However, Liang’s definition of the term is more reminiscent of fascism than the democracy 
he purportedly advocated. To Liang, “to be ruled” meant to be “without disorder,” a literally 
mechanistic metaphor that he applies without distinction to a single body as to a body of persons.58  
Liang compares this group to an “army,” by appealing to a Rousseauian general will: “the leader of 
this army is the law comprised by the inner knowledge of each person’s mind.”59  That the law 
emerges from the mass, rather than one person, somehow makes everyone the leader.  
This has the result of theorizing the individual actors out of the picture, substituting their 
divergent motivations with a reified groupness that Liang deems tractable only to outside forces 
(that is, foreign domination).60  This sudden move from individual to group destabilizes the 
meaning of “self-rule,” rendering it not an internally governed impulse as he seems to say at the 
beginning but a condition of “being in order” that presumes a homogeneity of preference, activity 
and opinion. Not only does this silence the question of individual motivation, it also makes the 
group vulnerable to an “ordering” from the outside, either to enforce this homogeneity or to 
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manipulate it without the friction that attends political action in conditions of true plurality.  Once 
the assumption of “self-rule” as a purely group concept is made, the masses again recede into the 
background of political life. Society is thus rendered simply another external reality, like regional 
warlords, economic stagnation, or foreign aggression, whose influence was to be borne out, fought 
against, and perhaps manipulated, but never activated in any political sense.  Because the people 
must be acted-upon before it (or they) can become actor(s), the literatus-bureaucrat is once again 
cast as a member of a privileged elite that alone possesses a self-motivated capacity for action. 
Zhang reverses Liang’s typology by asking how the “people,” a group in classical 
philosophy condemned to be effectually inert, can occupy the roles once played by literati.  Zhang’s 
most explicit treatment of the identity and implications of non-traditional political actors is found in 
his 1914  essay “On the Centripetal and Centrifrugal Forces of Government,” inspired by an essay 
of the same name by the English political scientist James Bryce.  Zhang’s essay is revealing both 
for how it applies (however superficially) scientific principles to politics, and for how it comes to 
terms with the variety of “forces” unleashed in Chinese society after the fall of the Qing.  From 
journalists to warlords to local gentry, massive numbers of new political actors responded to the 
unprecedented political contexts generated by the republican revolution.61  Rather than dismiss 
these new actors as enemies of order, Zhang’s essay straightforwardly incorporates them as 
inevitable and potentially useful elements of political life. These forces are defined by their ability 
to apply what Zhang calls extra-political measures to problems that are not formally recognized by 
the official regime.  Quoting Bryce, Zhang explains that “In politics, we may call the tendency 
which draws men or groups of men together into one organized community and keeps them there a 
Centripetal force, and that which makes men, or groups, break away and disperse, a Centrifugal.”62 
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The “centrifrugal” forces of non-traditional actors, Zhang argues, should be balanced by a 
constitution that integrates their needs and abilities by viewing their activity as politically relevant.   
Zhang’s adoption of such scientific language for describing how politics and political actors 
work suggests a deliberate rendering of political activity as a force of nature, which I take to be his 
first step in incorporating “the people” into the literati model.  Like many of his contemporaries, 
Zhang too invoked Darwinian social theories and the doctrine of evolution to supplement his 
arguments about politics. Yet using science rather than more interpretive or normative techniques 
for understanding political life seems to work against Zhang’s exhortations to self-awareness. In the 
process of incorporating  non-traditional political actors, Zhang seems to discount, rather than 
valorize, their contributions to the polity-building project: it casts them as independent variables in a 
prototypical, behavioralist social science rather than as spontaneous actors whose self-awareness 
alone can give meaning to the polity they build.  
But Zhang may be attempting another kind of transformation here, one that turns on his 
identity of theorizing with effective political action typified by the literatus posture. Consider why 
the behavioralist revolution in Western political science has provoked criticism from advocates of 
more agonistically political conceptions. These theorists warn that scientific terminology applied to 
politics enacts a categorically incorrect and potentially stultifying conceptual shift: using science to 
describe or analyze political phenomena edges dangerously close to condemning spontaneous 
political behavior to the status of a predictable activity, and hence evacuating political actors and 
activity of their spontaneity, unpredictability, and will. As Sheldon Wolin explained in his seminal 
essay “Political Theory as a Vocation,” these assumptions enforce the same uncritical and ergo 
“untheoretical” assumptions of prevailing political ideology that justifies the present “authoritative 
allocation of values” in society.63  The employment of such “methods” itself transforms the world 
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into the shape the researcher’s agenda needs it to be: “the employment of method [i.e., behavioralist 
political science] assumes, even requires, that the world be of one kind rather than another if 
techniques are to be effective.”64 
  Wolin’s essay means to criticize the ways in which behavioralism casts the world in its own 
image, and thus lacks the objectivity it professes. Like Pitkin, Wolin himself maintained an 
ambivalent position about the status of the theorist, reading theory as both dangerously potent, yet 
decidedly necessary for seeing otherwise overlooked possibilities for action.65 Such ambivalence 
suggests that when Wolin criticizes practitioners of behavioralism for their failure to recognize the 
bias of their own vision, he also says something else: how we see or “theorize” is integral to 
establishing our orientation in the world, and that this act of theorizing (including even the initial 
decision about how to theorize) wreaks indelible changes in the entire structure of fact.66  In other 
words, a theory constitutes a method for viewing a situation that remains a highly potent device 
through which real control can be exercised.  It is this more general notion that, despite Wolin’s 
opposition to the scientific vocabulary Zhang employs, is recoverable as a way of articulating how 
Zhang expects “self-awareness” to actually work.  
Zhang is not “naturalizing” these social forces so as to render them politically intractable 
(and thus beyond the pale of criticism); he adopts these terms rather to affirm them as actors of 
political life.  Zhang’s analysis thus leads him to identify many non-traditional subgroups and 
individuals as politically significant and as worthy political agents, including most prominently 
individuals who do not occupy official posts, peasants (especially those involved in uprisings), and 
factional interests opposed to policies of the ruling party. For Zhang, these sometimes violent 
interventions in politics should find peaceful yet powerful outlets within a properly designed 
constitution that allows all comers to “express their ideas and find peace in their own lot,” and 
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makes them capable of “achieving their own place.”67  In fact, his identification of these people and 
groups as “forces” (力) does not disable them from rupturing, challenging or changing the political 
status quo. The scientific language he adopts here rather legitimates these actors, by underscoring 
the extent to which these actors are not only politically, but also metaphysically, potent.  
Self-awareness contributes to this renovation by articulating both a means of and 
significance for action taken by non-traditional actors. Earlier scholar-officials sensitive to the 
plight of the masses, like the heterodox Tang dynasty thinker Liu Zongyuan, simply urged officials 
to serve the people, without articulating an effective mechanism to make corrupt officials 
“frightened and obeisant” of the power the people actually possessed.68  Zhang sees this solution as 
leading merely to thousands of years of pent-up resentment and oppression, resolvable only by 
violent uprisings or outright revolution.69  To change this situation, the people must realize that “the 
power to rise up in anger to chasten and admonish [their rulers] abides in their own selves.”70  This 
return to the “self,” I argue, signals Zhang’s attempt to grant these non-traditional political actors 
the virtuous and effective capacities of literati, and thereby facilitates the second step in Zhang’s 
attempt to transform “the people” into literati actors.  Where much of the efficacy of the traditional 
Confucian literatus was seen to derive from his perfectibility, Zhang identifies alternative modes of 
efficacy and incorporates them into his model of action.71  Zhang invites these actors to see for 
themselves, to become aware, to act as if they, like imperial literati, alone bear responsibility for 
ordering the world.   
Zhang was not the only thinker to read the political action of a self-rule regime in terms of 
literati action; Sun Yatsen and the Nationalists also invited the people “to occupy the seats once 
reserved for gentry-scholars [i.e., literati]” in a “refurbished theater of moral politics.”72   Sun, 
however, believes this model of action requires top-down regulation of personal habits and hygiene 
22 
 
as much as moral virtue.73  Only Zhang realizes the identity of political actors with literati can 
ascribe to non-traditional actors an open-ended capacity to interpret, theorize about, and criticize 
their environment.  Specifically, Zhang exploits the identity between ruler and ruled implicit in 
democracy to argue that individuals comprising “the people” can most effectively operationalize 
their sovereignty not by rising up en masse, but by working toward achieving the status of literati 
themselves – namely by joining their demonstrated political efficacy to self-awareness, that is, the 
capacity for reflecting, envisioning, and enacting the socio-economic principles their commitment 
to democracy demands.  In assuming this literati posture, non-traditional actors will possess not 
only the raw power, but also the individualized will, to stand in tension with the normative values 
that overarch their social and political order.  The “people” comes to occupy the normative position 
capable of legitimatizing political rule; at the same time, however, each individual acts to mediate 
and criticize the normative whole toward which their capacities (activated via “self-awareness”) are 
oriented.   
For Zhang, then, the insertion of the “self” into democratic life means that individuals act for 
commonly shared ends, but they do so separately; they do not act “together” to transform their 
socio-political environment.  The scope Zhang allows for theorizing, therefore, is neither as broad 
nor as ambitious as Pitkin characterizes it. What the self-aware individual re-envisions is not 
primarily all of society, but rather his or her place within a properly reconfigured political and social 
milieu.  The fragmentary and diffuse character of theory, emblematized by the wide dispersal of 
non-traditional actors, need furnish no transcendent perspective to be inspiring or meaningful as 
world-changing theory. It is rather active within local situations and unexpected places, not only at 
the top of the political (or intellectual) hierarchy. Zhang essentially asks those capable of social and 
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political action to become “theorists”—inverting Pitkin’s solution, which makes theorists become 
actors.74   
 
The Political Implications of Self-Awareness 
Despite the insights self-awareness affords, Zhang’s account does pose an array of non-
negligible problems that have long been identified as problematic for (even if characteristic of) 
imperial Chinese political thought.  I have already discussed above some Republican-era critiques 
of traditional Chinese individualism made by Liang Qichao and Hu Shi. These critiques have been 
further elaborated by modern-day scholars of late imperial China, who blame the individuality of 
Chinese political action for impeding the collective identity that makes democracy and limited 
government possible.  Frederic Wakeman, for example, characterizes the role of Ming and Qing 
intellectuals as perpetually caught up in the irresolvable conundrum of criticizing a despotic state 
while remaining unable to acknowledge the possibility of “detaching sovereignty for themselves” as 
a group.75 Wakeman argues that the longstanding Confucian virtue of dissent and censure—the 
interpretive mediation between moral and political authority performed by the literatus—was 
merely a “self-defined right of evaluative dissent” that did not reach beyond individual 
admonishment to “conceive of group rights” that Wakeman believes could endow them with 
independence from state control for effective social action.76  The failure of Chinese scholar-
officials to establish politically grounded and defensible rights of collective action also troubles 
Chang Hao, who pictures would-be Chinese reformers perpetually vacillating between personal 
self-cultivation as an “inner” location of cosmological authority, on the one hand, and unquestioned 
obedience to “external,” cosmologically sanctioned institutions, on the other, as methods of 
ameliorating social and political problems.77   
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For Wakeman, Chang, and others, Western theories of constitutional government and 
collective political mobilization, introduced into China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, rescued Chinese thinkers from perpetually replicating these futilely individualist political 
actions to which most brands of Confucianism encouraged them.78  These critiques can be amplified 
by Pitkin’s own characterization of political life as a collective enterprise, whose possibilities 
necessarily exceed the powers of any one individual to control or even decisively influence. When 
others are acknowledged to possess an equality of self-directed capacity, any political theory must 
grapple with the unpredictable consequences of both coordinated and non-coordinated action taken 
with and against others.  Taken together, these critiques reveal the limits of Zhang’s self-awareness: 
although Zhang sometimes treats self-awareness as both necessary and sufficient to build a political 
regime, it should not (and probably cannot) dominate the practices that sustain regimes of self-rule: 
Zhang’s individualist model may potentially create what, using his own words, we could call 
“centripetal,” polity-destroying “forces” that threaten to submerge democratic politics in a regime of 
either self-absorption or radical impotence.  Self-awareness is important but insufficient; in a 
mature regime, for both normative and empirical reasons, it requires tempering by other values that 
orient the self to others and their demands.   
In other work, Zhang does elaborate a set of such values.79 I still believe, however, that his 
concept of self-awareness on its own nevertheless contributes to thinking about political action, 
especially in conditions of political breakdown.  By characterizing action as something that “while 
based in individual autonomy” is nevertheless “oriented toward solidarity with others,”80  Pitkin 
(via a discussion of Arendt) means to affirm the capacity of other individuals to change political 
environments. Action taken with others seems essential to performing politics as an activity that 
works with, rather than on, fellow human beings—it is an antidote to the mentality Arendt identified 
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as belonging to homo laborans and a return to the vita activa.81  Yet Zhang’s self-awareness 
concept reminds us that although politics is about living together with others, specific kinds of 
political action may require thinking about our efforts in a way that does not take action with others 
as constitutive (even if, and as, it affirms the potential of others to transform the political landscape).   
In this sense, self-awareness is both something to see and a way of seeing, both a vision and 
a lens.  As a vision, it crafts those material and visual environments that mark effective, human-
initiated change.  Zhang’s juxtaposition of the “self” and “external things,” a point I discussed 
above, reminds us that our material environment also stands to influence, inspire, and shape 
personal action. The self-aware individual takes actions and affects environments that influence and 
are influenced by the decisions of others, but it does not take acting with others as definitive of 
political action or efficacy. This is how self-awareness functions as a lens: it helps us see an old 
situation in a new way that revises our targets and sources of action.  Because other people are no 
longer what the individual is striving to overcome, they also cannot seen as constant potential 
inhibitors of his own interests.  Disagreement between political actors is not cast as the “problem” 
that must be resolved before efficacious political action can take place. Instead, the individual can 
begin from just where he is.  
In situations where we “lack the very ideas of action, of politics, of freedom” because no 
one has “the relevant experience that would make those ideas meaningful,”82 this dual function of 
self-awareness helps to identify what steps can be taken before spontaneous public action is 
possible. Zhang explains that these little steps accumulate “like grains of rice in a storehouse,” 
beginning from the insight that “selves” are the first actors upon “external things.”83  Asking how 
self-rule could establish itself in a place like China, which lacked the indigenous traditions that 
supported its emergence elsewhere, Zhang cannot regard acting together in public in the way Pitkin 
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and Arendt do: it cannot be seen as a “lost treasure,” an experience whose eventual return can 
perhaps emerge from existing vestiges of past practices.84  Therefore, Zhang’s first task is to 
motivate disparate, internal visions of political community and to explain how their external 
manifestation, even by one individual in the form of everyday practices, can matter.   
Zhang wants us to shift attention away from others toward ourselves— not so as to indulge 
unreflective and selfish desires, but to guard against shifting to others our own responsibility for 
change.  In an essay further elaborating the connection between self-awareness and polity-building 
entitled “The State and the Self,” Zhang identified “self-confusion” and “shirking one’s 
responsibility” as the twin dangers that arise out of a “negligence of the self” (亡我). These dangers 
emerge as a result of believing that “the amount of good and bad in the world is not something that 
can be increased or lessened by one’s own involvement.”85  Although potentially indulging our 
capacity for tyranny, self-awareness nevertheless explains why that danger must be courted: 
presuming that action in concert is everywhere always possible, or at least is always the proper 
orientation for our actions, overdetermines the sources of change.  Assuming that the only effective 
action is action taken with others, Zhang fears, can easily fall into the trap of thinking that “my 
contribution doesn’t matter.” In the situation Zhang faced, the danger of individuals failing to take 
action was far greater than the danger of tyranny that self-awareness may inadvertently produce.       
Taken alone, then, self-awareness may underwrite a politics of isolation and alienation: 
when one is stuck believing that only one’s own actions matter, the mutual relationships and sheer 
collective energy that sustain a republican political regime are lost, and individuals are driven either 
to tyranny or (as were many imperial Confucians) eremitism. But there are also dangers to reading 
political action as always and everywhere culminating in action with others: at best, we risk 
overlooking the important kinds of self-work that must take place before collective action even 
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makes sense. At worst, we allow ourselves to blame the failure of our ideal world to emerge on 
those intransigents who refuse to coalesce in collective action toward one’s own specified ends.   
In republican China, the kinds of subjectivities required by democracy were not necessarily 
engendered by the Chinese past, by its shared practices, or by recognized co-membership by its 
citizens in a nominally republican polity. Indeed, under conditions like these, or under those Pitkin 
and Arendt identified with “the social,” the circular relationships that tie individuals to their 
community just as often replicate past regimes as produce future ones.  Self-awareness can rescue 
political actors in these certain, desperate situations from the paralysis of futility, by explaining why 
and how personal, microlevel foundations for action do matter. By concentrating on the process 
individuals undergo in coming to believe that a polity or state is worthy of being willed into 
existence, Zhang identifies one important way in which personal transformation is intimately linked 
to political reality and explains why such transformation must necessarily take place on that 
individual level.  In becoming “theorists” in the process of self-awareness to which Zhang exhorts 
us, we necessarily take on for ourselves the perpetual mediation of the gap between our own 
efficacy and the wider social order that our efforts bring into being.  Indeed, the very power of this 
action is that it sometimes can and must proceed when one “knows that it cannot be done, but does 
it anyway” (Analects 14.6) – assuming anything less would mean giving in to the reality one’s 
ideals persist in striving against, a move that would fundamentally disable the efficacy of one’s 
“self-awareness.” That the position of this willful individual is tenuous and anxiety-ridden only 
attests to magnitude of one’s power. To paraphrase Pitkin, it is always oneself, and never others, 
that is simultaneously the hindrance to and the source of all change in the world.  Zhang, however, 
insists that to render this insight an effective motivation for political action, we must realize that it is 
the “I” that must first act, because it is that same “I” that theorizes.    
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Awareness of the self is needed precisely when politics itself has failed – that is, has failed 
not in terms of accomplishing some objective, but failed absolutely—but this does not discount its 
political characteristics. As an important component of transformative action, “self-awareness” 
provides a potentially fruitful reinterpretation of what we may consider to be “political action.” It 
reorients the focus of political activity away from “action in concert” toward disparate – though 
cumulative – efforts to render shared problems incrementally and personally tractable, in ways that 
complement or supplant deliberately coordinated public control.  At the very least, this account 
suggests that the first (but, importantly, not the last or only) question to ask when faced with “drift” 
may not be how to communalize our goals and thus build from shared purposes, but how to realize 
these goals successfully, severally.  Whether the accretion of efforts will proceed as Zhang 
envisioned is a matter of dispute, but it is certainly the case that the reorientation for political action 
his model provides mitigates the overwhelming odds against our really doing anything.   
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